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Abstract
This empirical study examines welfare gains and losses that
would result from alternative fishery management regimes. In
an application to the North Sea demersal fisheries, the
study shows that these fishery resources can give rise to
large economic rent. Under an optimal management regime, the
rent can be as high as three quarters of harvesting cost.
As present, however, political conflicts make it unlikely
that an efficiency-oriented fishery regime will be installed
soon. Policy-makers appear to be unaware of the welfare cost
of alternative fishery policies. This study tries to fill
this void. As a guide of the formulation of fishery policies,
it evaluates and compares four alternative fishery management
regimes. The economic rent is estimated for each of these
regimes. These estimates provide both a cardinal as well as
an ordinal ranking of the alternative policies.-2-
I. Objective
The lack of an efficient property rights structure is widely
recognized as the prime impediment to higher profitability
of the fishing industry and to the prevention of overexploi-
tation. Under open, i.e., free and unrestricted access to
fishery resources, the potential economic rent tends to be
dissipated by overfishing. While the need for replacing the
open access regime by a legal-institutional structure which
restricts access is now widely accepted, biologists and
economists differ on the choice of the appropriate criteria
to be used in fishery management. In addition, aside from
theoretical consideration, the practicality of either manage-
ment criterion is an open question.
This study considers four alternative fishery regimes. First,
the economically first-best regime with the optimality crite-
rion of optimal sustainable yield (OSY) is examined. Second,
as a variant of OSY, the criterion of uniform profitability
(UPY) is imposed in order to analyse what efficiency impli-
cations would be obtained if the management authority - for
distributional or other reasons - would wish to follow the
rule that profitability should be uniform over all species.
Third, the biologically optimal fishery based on the crite-
rion of maximum sustainable yield (MSY) is evaluated. Final-
ly, the open access regime with the bionomic equilibrium
(BEY) of long run equality between revenue and cost is
examined.
1
The inefficiency of the open access regime has been the
subject of many theoretical studies; cf. Gordon (1954),
Christy and Scott (1965), Clark (1976), and the survey of
Peterson and Fisher (1977). For empirical evidence, see,
for example, Bell (1972).-3-
The paper proceeds as follows: In Section II, the optimality
conditions are derived within a full dynamic context. In
order to arrive at empirically operational models, the
restrictive assumption of a stationary state - implying a
zero social rate of discount - is imposed in Section III.
Section IV presents further empirical specification. Empiri-
cal results of the model application to the multi-species
fishery of the North Sea are presented in Section V. Section
VI contains the conclusion and discusses the efficiency
ranking of the four alternative fishery regimes.
II. Optimality Conditions
As a renewable resource, the stock of fish is dependent on
the stock's rate of reproduction, the rate of natural
mortality, and the intensity of fishing. Thus, the
population dynamics of a multiple species fishery with n
individual species can be represented by
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 ) i-1,2,...,n (1)
where g(.) is the net natural growth of the stock, which
depends on the stock size, B
1, and f(.) is the attrition of
the stock due to fishing, which in turn depends on the stock
size and on the amount of resources used in fishing, the





For examples for this specification of population dynamics,
see Clark (1976) and Peterson and Fisher (1977). Past
studies of multiple species fishery have concentrated on
the implications of biological and technological
interdependences (through, e.g., predator-prey or by-catch
relationships); for examples, see Anderson (1975), Clark
(1976), or Huppert (1979).
2
To simplify the discussion, it is assumed here that species
are biologically and technologically independent.-4-
Optimality in resource use requires maximization of its
present value. With perfect competition in product and
factor markets, the present value of the resource of
multiple species fisheries is
n °°







t • dt (2)
i=1 o
where 5 is the social rate of discount p is the fish price
of species i, and w is the constant unit cost of fishing
effort. Maximization of the present value subject to
condition (1) yields the economically optimal level of
fishing. This is equivalent to an optimal control problem
where the Hamiltonian

















is maximized. The marginal user cost of species i in situ
(the uncaught stock of i) is X . For a dynamic optimum, the
following necessary conditions have to be satisfied for all
species:
H
1 = (pifj - w)e"
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For the exploitation of a multiple species fishery to be at
the optimal level, price has to be equal to the sum of
marginal harvesting cost and marginal user cost. This has to
hold for all the species involved at any given moment of
time.
Undqr competitive conditions and irrespective of the fishery
management scheme (restrictive or open access), each fisher-
man attempts to maximize his own share of the current
industry profit. As far as fisherman j is concerned, the
potential profit from fishing of multiple species is:
i f
1 i i
n. Z (p — E. - WE.) (8)
However, the individual fisherman j's optimization behavior
is constrained by the endowment level of the production
factors (the capacity to generate a flow of fishing effort):
_ i
E.
 = Z E .
D 3
The constrained maximization of the current profit for indi-
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For the case of a single species fishery, see Kim (1981)
for analogous conditions.-6-
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They in turn imply that
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Under competitive conditions, the individual fisherman will
attempt to allocate his given endowment of productive re-
sources in such a way that the expected average productivity
is equalized across potential fisheries of various species.
In other words, by individual optimization behaviour of
fishermen, the average profit (and the average revenue in
the present case of constant unit cost of fishing effort) is
equalized across the fishing industry. This condition has
to be satisfied for the private equilibrium in a multiple
species fishery. In disequilibrium, intra-firm movements of
fishing efforts will work as the equilibrating force.
As noted, under the open access the fishery tends to converge
to a state of fishery where the economic rents of
1
The equilibrium condition is expressed in terms of average
revenue rather than average profit, since both are
equivalent under the present assumption of constant unit
cost of fishing effort. Relaxation of this cost assumption
does not qualitatively change the following discussions.— 7 —
all respective species are completely dissipated. In the
present context, this long run equilibrium is a special case
when the resource constraint is not binding for all
fishermen involved, i.e. when x=0.
If the management authority chooses the uniform
profitability as a prerequisite for the implementation of a
comprehensive fishery management scheme, the management
authority would then act as a constrained optimizer, i.e.,
maximizing the present value of the multiple species fishery
resource (2) subject to the biological and private economic
equilibrium conditions (1) and (10). This is equivalent to
maximization of the following Hamiltonean:



















The necessary conditions for a dynamic optimum fishery are;
for species 1,
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and for species i,
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The corresponding adjoint equations are; for species 1,








This study adopts the specification of Peterson and Fisher
(1977) for the discussion of the fishery under competitive
conditions.-8-
and in the case of species i (i=2,3,...,n),
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The resulting optimum conditions are: for species 1 ,
AV
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t = ^ •? $
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And for species i,
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A e = - (j> I|J (17)
where A and <(> retain the same functional forms as A
and $ . Conditions (16) and (17) , when combined, imply that
I -A_ f o (18)
Together with the equilibrium condition (10), (18) completes
the set of necessary conditions and provides a unique
solution for the dynamic optimum fishery of multiple species
resource. The dynamic optimum when the equilibrium constraint




for all species i(i=l,2,...,n).-9-
The immediate implication of the above constrained optimum
condition (18) is that if a fishery resource with multiple
species is managed in such a way that the private economic
equilibrium is not disturbed, some species should be managed
beyond the level of independent economic optima while other
species are managed below the level of their own optima, and
furthermore that the degree of these divergencies should be
exactly offset among the species. Second, even if species
are independent of each other in a technological (e.g., by-
catch) and biological (e.g., predator-prey) sense, they are
economically related to each other in a competitive fishery.
III. Model
For the empirical specification of the fishery population
dynamics (1), it is assumed that, in the absence of fishing,






1) i = 1,2,..,n (19)
where B is the maximum stock size of species i under pre-







Combination of (19) and (20) leads to the empirical specifi-







This specification of fishery population dynamics, often
alternatively referred to as the "Schaefer type" fishery
model, is commonly attributed to Schaefer (1954) and Gordon
(1954) .-10-
The biological equilibrium condition requiring a balance
between the net growth and the fishing mortality, i.e.
dB
1/dt=O, yields the steady state relationship between
catch, C , and fishing effort (the sustainable catch-effort











111.1 Optimal Sustainable Yield (OSY)
Economic optimality in the chosen stationary state (OSY)
requires maximization of the stationary profit of the mul-
tiple species fishing industry:






1) } - wE
1 (23)
Thus, the necessary condition for OSY is that the fishery
resources should be managed at levels where the fisheries of
individual species just break even at the margin in the
stationary state context, i.e., where marginal sustainable





1) - w = 0 i = 1,2,..,n (24)
111.2 Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY)
Alternatively, biological optimality in the stationary state
context (MSY) requires that the stationary catch (revenue)
1
For discussions of stationary state fishery of single
species, see Gordon (1954), Gulland (1961), Bell (1972),
Cadima (1978), and Kim (1981), etc.-11-
be maximized. Thus, under the MSY, species should be
managed at levels where the marginal sustainable catch





1) =0 i =1,2,..,n (25)
The MSY fishery regime would be equivalent to the OSY
fishery regime if harvesting were costless.
III.3 Uniform Profitability (UPY)
For the individual fisherman (as represented by the fisher-
man j), who has to allocate his given endowment of produc-
tion factors (fishing effort) to the fishing of multiple
species, the profit maximization is equivalent to maximiza-
tion of the Lagrangean:
i . ri . _ i
L = E (p
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As shown in the previous section, the condition for a
private optimum is that the average sustainable revenue (and

















h) i ? h (26)
Unless the average sustainable revenue is uniform among
alternative species fisheries, there will be intra-firm
movements of fishing effort (disequilibrium): The above
condition is necessary to maintain private economic equili-
brium.-12-
III.4 Open Access (BEY)
Examination of the above condition (26) further reveals that
sustained fishery operation under the competitive condition
converges to the state of exploitation where the production
factor endowment is not-a binding constraint for the fishery
industry as a whole. Thus, unrestricted competition induces
overfishing to the extent that any potentially existing
economic rent is completely dissipated in the long run. This
state of fishery is commonly called the bionomic equilibrium
(BEY), and the fishery at BEY can be characterized by the






1) - w = 0 i = 1,2,..,n (27)
If the fishery management authority is required to guarantee
uniform profitability, the managing rule would be maximiza-
tion of stationary rent from fishing subject to the private
equilibrium condition (UPY). This is equivalent to maximiza-
tion of the Lagrangean:
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This, together with the equilibrium condition (26) , consti-
tutes the full set of necessary condition for the UPY fishery
regime. Interpretations are similar to what has been discus-
sed in the previous section for condition (18).
With a simple case where only two species are involved in a
fishery from a common fishing ground, figure 1 explains
alternative fishery regimes so far discussed in the statio-
nary state context.
In figure 1, the revenue-effort relationships are drawn on
parabolic curves and the cost-effort relationship is drawn
with a straight line, reflecting the stationary state speci-
fication of the "surplus production" model and the assump-
tion of constant unit cost of fishing effort. On the basis
of what has been discussed, OSY fishery regime is shown to
1 2 induce fishing efforts E and E , where marginal revenue
(the slope of the revenue curve) equals marginal cost (the
slope of the cost line). In this case, marginal profit is
equalized at zero for all species individually, while aver-
age profit is not equalized across the fishing industry.
On the other hand, UPY would result in fishing efforts such
as E+ and E+, where marginal revenue (in general) does not
equal marginal cost: Marginal profit is not equalized across
the fishing industry. Under the UPY fishery regime, however,
average profit, by definition, is equalized among different
species (in general at a non-zero level). The diagram shows
that the constraint of private economic equilibrium trans-
forms the OSY in such a way that marginal profit is positive
for some species (species 1) while the opposite is true for
others (species 2). This, in turn, implies that the UPY
1
From here on, the word "sustainable" will be excluded from
the text unless its use is necessary for clarification.-14-
Figure 1





fishery regime renders such a state of exploitation that
some species (species 1) are exploited less and others
(species 2) are exploited beyond the levels expected under
the OSY fishery regime.
Additionally shown in figure 1 are the fishery regimes
corresponding to MSY and BEY. In the diagram, the MSY
fishery regime is expected to result in fishing efforts E
2
and E while the BEY fishery regime would induce fishing m 1 2
efforts E and E, . In the following sections, efficiency
aspects of the four alternative fishery regimes - OSY, UPY,
MSY and BEY - are examined empirically.
IV. Application
Among major fisheries, the North Sea fishery offers a prime
testing ground for the empirical model proposed in this
paper. As a first step toward empirical investigation of the
efficiency aspects in fishery management, the locus of the
sustainable catch-effort relationship (22) is estimated for
individual demersal species. This is followed by construction
of,the cost function, wE, which then allows quantification
of potential rent under alternative fishery management
regimes.
Due to the well-known paucity of appropriate economic data
on fisheries, there have been few successful attempts at
empirical applications for the "surplus production" model
discussed here. The model assumes that the fishery is re-
stricted to a single fishing ground. The present study, by
and large, accomodates this assumption, since it chooses a
relatively large fishing ground, the North Sea, and its
scope is confined to demersal species whose migratory
patterns are more, narrowly restricted than those of other-16-
species. In addition, the model assumes that fishery
technologies are directive toward single species and that
species are biologically independent whereas in reality
biological and technological conditions mandate a
mixed-species approach.
The empirical specification offered here starts by weighting
the catch of individual species by its relative price to a
numeraire species (here, the cod price is employed as the
numeraire, whose unit is called value-weighted cod
equivalent weight, CEW, in short). Thus, the value-weighted
catch of species i, R , is:
R
1 = CV
where C is the catch weight and p is the price of species
i relative to that of cod.
In the "surplus production" fishery model, fishing is
envisioned as being carried out with a single composite
factor of production, the fishing effort. Following other
studies, this study measures fishing effort in terms of
1
Demersal species are bottom-dwelling species, distinguished
from pelagic species whose migratory patterns are not
confined to a single fishing ground. The demersal species
chosen for individual investigations are cod, haddock,
plaice, saithe, and whiting; others are aggregated into
"miscellaneous species" category.-17-
fishing hours if a "standard fishing boat". Thus, the effec-
tive fishing effort directed toward individual species in
the total fishery from the North Sea (R
1) is estimated by
where R_ is the value-weighted catch of species i and h is
2
 s
the total fishing hours of the standard boat.
It is assumed that the fishing power of boats changes in
direct proportion to the change in boat tonnage. Since the
tonnage characteristics of the standard boat (the British
motor trawlers) have remained roughly constant over time,
this assumption implies that the productivity of the
standard boat is assumed to have remained constant over the
sample period.
Finally this study is restricted to annual observations for
the period from 1954 to 1973. During this period, unlike at
present, quotas were not imposed and fishing took place in
4
an open-access environment. Table 1 summarizes the data on
catch and effort for individual species during the sample
period.
1
This procedure can be justified on the basis of private
economic equilibrium condition that in each fishing period
the average revenue should be equalized across fishery
industry.
2
See the appendix for definitions and underlying assumptions
in constructing fishing effort data in terms of the
effective unit of the standard boat.
3
As shown in Kim (1981), relaxation of this assumption does
not change qualitative conclusions.
4
While quotas were not imposed during the sample period,
technological restrictions, however, are widely considered
as not having led to a sizable impact on overfishing. Cf.
ICES (1976), Saedersdal (1975) , or the 'Review of State
1
series of FAO.Table 1













































































































































































































































































































1, ICES, various issues.
Units of catch and fishing effort are 1 ton and 1 fishing hour-20-
V. Results
V.1 Sustainable Revenue-Effort Regressions
Due to biological factors - most notably, age composition and
reproduction characteristics - current fishing influences not
only current but also future harvest potentials. However, this
relationship is not known with accuracy. Lacking any prior
knowledge of these intertemporal effects, four alternative re-
gressions of the sustainable revenue-effort relationships (31)
are offered here: Two regressions by the ordinary least esti-
mation, and other two regressions by the Cocrane-Orcutt esti-
mation.
These regressions differ only by the lag structure imposed on











1 = E E
1t_s / (s+1)
o
The two regressions differ according to s being alternatively
set at 0 and 3. Individual results are reported in Tables A2
and A3, and their summary are presented in Table 2.
The unit (harvesting) cost of fishing effort has been calcu-
lated at 210.9 CEW tons per 1000 fishing hours. (For deriva-
tion of harvesting cost, see the appendix.)
Under higher cost assumption, the unit cost of fishing
effort is estimated at 288.2 CEW tons per 1000 fishing
hours.-21-
Table 2























Summary estimates show the average slope of the following





































Choice of equations are based on (1) significance and (2)
sign of estimated coefficients. The coefficients of chosen
regression results are all significant at 2 % level, ex-
cept those of the catch-effort regression of whiting.-22-
V.2 Efficiency Aspects
In this section, with the measurement of fishing effort, reve-
nue, cost, and profit, the efficiency consequences of the four
alternative regimes will be examined. Table 3 shows the esti-
mation results for the aggregate case of the entire North Sea
fishery as well as for individual demersal species fisheries .
The Economic Optimum (OSY) Regime
Under the economic optimum regime, whose optimality criterion
is the maximum flow of economic rent from fishing, the demer-
sal species fisheries of the North Sea taken as a whole are
expected to yield 1.91 million CEW tons of revenue at a har-
vesting cost of 1.08 million CEW tons. Total fishing effort
amounts to 5.12 million hours. The aggregate profit is 826
thousand CEW tons and the average profit rate 7 6.5 %.
Of the five individual demersal species fisheries of the North
Sea, the haddock fishery is shown to have the largest potential
revenue of 383 thousand CEW tons while the saithe fishery has
the smallest potential revenue expected at 68 thousand CEW tons.
The haddock fishery also has the largest total harvesting cost
at 194 thousand CEW tons, and the saithe fishery the lowest at
41 thousand CEW tons.
In terms of the optimum potential economic rent, the haddock
fishery is the most promising with 189 thousand CEW tons and the
saithe fishery ranks last with only 27 thousand CEW tons. The
average profit varies from 66 % for the saithe fishery to 98 %
for the haddock fishery.
1
The results in this section pertain to the cases under the
low cost assumption. For the results under the high cost as-
sumption, see table A4 in the appendix.-23-
Table 3




















































































































































































§1. Source: Table 2 and the low cost assumption of 210.9 CEW tons
per 1000 fishing hours.
§2. Units: effort in 1000 hours; revenue in 1000 CEW tons;
cost in 1000 CEW tons; profit in 1000 CEW tons; and
profit rate in per centage.-24-
The Uniform Profitability (UPY) Regime
Under the management constraint of uniform profitability,
where the flow of economic rent is maximized while maintain-
ing an equal profit rate across the entire fishing industry,
the aggregate demersal species fishery of the North Sea is
expected to yield 809 thousand CEW tons as the economic rent;
the aggregate revenue is 1.89 million CEW tons at a harvest-
ing cost of 1.08 million CEW tons, and the total fishing ef-
fort amounts to 5.12 million hours. The fishery profit is
therefore equivalent to 74.9 % of harvesting cost, which is
uniformly applicable for all the fisheries of the individual
species.
Among the individual species, the largest total revenue of
418 thousand CEW tons is obtained for the haddock fishery
while the smallest revenue of 61 thousand CEW tons is ex-
pected for the saithe fishery. Correspondingly, the haddock
fishery requires the highest total harvesting cost at 239
thousand CEW tons and the saithe fishery has the lowest cost
at 3 5 thousand CEW tons. As a result, the largest economic
rent\is expected from the haddock fishery at 179 thousand CEW
tons, whereas the smallest rent is expected from the saithe
fishery at 26 thousand CEW tons.
The Biological Optimum (MSY) Regime
Under the biological optimum regime, whose optimality re-
quires maximization of the flow of fishery catch irrespec-
tive of harvesting cost, aggregate rent amounts to 466 thou-
sand CEW tons. Aggregate revenue is about 2.27 million
CEW tons and the corresponding aggregate harvesting cost is-25-
1.80 million CEW tons. The aggregate average profit is around
26 %.
In terms of the relative magnitude of the results for indivi-
dual species, the same observations as before can be made.
Thus, under the MSY regime, the haddock fishery would generate
the largest revenue of 432 thousand CEW tons, and the saithe
fishery would yield the smallest revenue of 83 thousand CEW
tons. The corresponding harvesting cost for the haddock fishe-
ry is 292 thousand CEW tons, and that for the saithe fishery
is 72 thousand CEW tons.
It should be emphasized here that under the MSY regime the po-
tential economic rent is quite small while the revenue is large,
This follows from the neglect of harvesting cost. The largest
fishery profit under the MSY regime (from the haddock fishery)
would amount to only 140 thousand CEW tons, while the smallest
profit (from the saithe fishery) would be minimal 11 thousand
CEW tons. Consequently, the average profit rates for the in-
dividual species fisheries under the MSY regime range from 16 %
to 48 %, revealing not only low levels but also wide differenc-
es in profitability among species •
The Open Access (BEY) Regime
Finally, Table 3 also reports the results for the open
access regime, which is characterized by the lack of an ac-
As can be seen in table A4 in the appendix, the average pro-
fit of individual species fisheries under the MSY regime would
range between - 15% and 8 % under the alternative high cost
assumption.-26-
tive fishery management and, thus, by the complete dissipa-
tion of economic rent. Here again, the largest fishery ac-
tivity is shown for the haddock fishery, and the opposite is
true for the saithe fishery. Under open access, the fishery
in the aggregate will generate 2.16 million CEW tons at an
effort of 10.2 million fishing hours.
VI. Conclusion
This study has investigated the demersal species fisheries
of the North Sea within the stationary state context of the
"surplus production" fishery model. The empirical findings
show that fishery policies following the biological optimum
(MSY) or the open access (BEY) criteria would forego econo-
mic rents in the amounts of 3 60 and 826 thousand CEW tons,
respectively, as compared with the economically first-best
regime (OSY). The large welfare losses implied by open ac-
cess, i. e., lack of any active fishery policy, may not come
as a surprise. What is surprising, however, is that biologi-
cal optimality (MSY) is revealed as an inappropriate manage-
ment criterion.
In contrast, the uniform profitability (UPY) regime fairs
quite well in comparison with the first-best choice of the
OSY regime. The efficiency loss of the UPY regime - as mea-
sured by the difference in the potential economic rent -
amounts to only 17 thousand CEW tons, which is about 2 % of
the rent under the OSY regime. Though inferior to the OSY
regime, the UPY regime is a very close second best choice.
The most striking difference between these two fishery re-
gimes lies in the interspecies variation of profit rates:
Under the OSY regime, the variation is as wide as 32 %,-27-
while under the UPY regime, by definition, equal profit rates
are maintained across the fishing industry. If the management
authority might - for distributional reasons - consider it im-
perative that profit opportunities among the fisheries of in-
dividual species in the region should be equalized, it may,
as this paper suggests, opt for such a regime without fear of
major efficiency losses.
Appendix
Catch: The value-weighted catch figures of the North Sea de-
mersal species fisheries are derived (i) from absolute catch
weight data as reported in Bulletin Statistique, the Inter-
national Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES), vari-
ous issues, and (ii) on the basis of relative catch prices of
British takings as reported in Sea Fisheries Statistical Tables,
various issues, by the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and
Food, U. K.
Fishing Effort and Catch Per Unit of Fishing Effort: This
study follows the common practice of relying on a composite
factor of production, fishing effort. Fishing effort is mea-
sured by fishing hours of the "standard boat", British motor
trawlers, as reported in Bulletin Statistique. This procedure
is based on the assumption that all the fishing boats
are subject to the same condition (as represented by the
catch per unit of fishing effort) as that experienced
by the standard boat on the common fishing ground. This has
been formally proved with the private economic equilibrium
condition (10). Catch per unit of effort (CPUE) is obtained
The data construction is based on Kim (1981). It is repeated
here for convenience.-28-
by dividing the value-weighted catch by fishing hours of the
standard boat as reported in Table A1.
Unit Cost of Fishing Effort: Direct cost data on the multiple
species fishery of the North Sea are not available. To obtain
proxies for the unobserved cost data, this study invokes the
open access equilibrium condition that in the long-run, reve-
nue must be at least as high as harvesting cost. Thus, the
observed CPUE should be at least as high as the unobserved
unit cost of effort; and consequently, following Hannesson
(1974) and as utilized in Kim (1981), the unit cost can be
inferred by the lowest historical level of CPUE. For the North
Sea fisheries considered here, 1973 shows the lowest CPUE le-
vel, which is employed as the low unit cost of fishing effort.
For the high cost calculation, the minimum of four year aver-
ages of CPUE over the observation period (1954 - 1973) is em-
ployed. This turns out to be the average of the years 1970 -
1973. This alternative cost figure is offered on the presump-
tion that the low 1973 CPUE may reflect short-run disequilibri-














































































































































































































































Source: 'Bulletin Statistique', ICES.
Units: effort in 1 fishing hour; catch in 1 ton.-30-
Table A2























































































































1. The regression is done with the current fishing effort as the
independent variable.
2. Units of the catch and the fishing effort are CEW tons and
1 000 fishing hours, respectively. The unit for the standard
error of regression is 1 000 CEW tons.
3. The regression results numbered with "-1" are the results of
ordinary least squares estimation, and those numbered "-2"
are the results Cochrane-Orcutt estimation.
4. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.-31-
Table A3



























































































































1. The regression is done with the average fishing effort of the
current and past three years as the independent variable.
2. Units are as explained in table ^2--32-
Table A4




















































































































































































§ Source and units are the same as in Table 3; Calculations are
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